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Abstract: 
This paper explores the effect of real estate brokerage-firm and agent characteristics on the prices 
received by home sellers. It develops a model for assessing the impact of firm and agent 
characteristics on the prices received by sellers in a multiple listing service (MLS). Empirical 
estimates of the model reveal no evidence that some brokers are able to obtain higher prices for 
the homes they sell than are others. This finding is consistent with the idea of an efficient 
information flow in the MLS market, where firms and individuals do not possess special 
advantages because information is shared within the MLS among agents, firms, sellers, and 
buyers. 
 
Article:  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been growing academic interest in the workings of the residential 
brokerage industry.
1
 Researchers have examined the question of how the price of housing is 
affected when a home owner sells through a real estate broker in preference to sale by owner. 
Several empirical studies (Doiron et al., 1985, and Jud and Frew, 1986) have found evidence that 
brokers obtain higher sales prices, enabling a typical seller to pass some part of the commission 
on to the buyer. Other studies by Kamath and Yantek (1982) and Colwell et al. (1992) have 
reported that brokers do not influence selling prices. A theoretical analysis by Salant (1991) has 
shown the effect of brokers on listing prices to be indeterminate. 
 
Another set of studies (Crellin et al., 1988; Follain et al., 1987; and Glower and Hendershott, 
1988) has examined the determinants of real estate agent incomes. Drawing on human capital 
theory developed by Becker (1975) and others, these studies have reported that agent income is 
directly related to (1) the possession of a broker's license, (2) the number of hours worked per 
week, (3) the level of schooling completed, (4) years of experience, and (5) the level of 
professional training. 
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 See, for example, Federal Trade Commission (1983) and the J. Real Estate Res. 3(2) (1988) special issue on real 
estate brokerage. 
The impact of franchise affiliation on brokerage performance and consumer perception also has 
been examined. Studies by Frew and Jud (1986) and Jud et al. (1994) have reported that 
franchise affiliation increases the earnings of brokerage firms. Research by Colwell and Marshall 
(1986) reported results that were mixed: franchise affiliation significantly increased home sales 
in 1980, but not in 1981. Other work by Nelson and Nelson (1988) has found that national 
franchise affiliation positively affects consumer perceptions of brokerage firms. Research by 
Johnson et al. (1988) reported that consumers believe that brokerage service quality is related to 
factors such as service quality assurances, firm characteristics, and service empathy. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine further the factors that influence the performance of 
residential real estate firms and their agents. The paper differs from past work in that it looks at 
the effect of firm and agent characteristics on selling prices within a multiple listing service 
(MLS). Unlike past research which has focused on differences between brokered sales and sales 
by owners, this paper looks at possible differences within an MLS. The paper is concerned with 
the issue of whether there are significant differences among agents that enable some to sell 
homes at higher prices than others. From the perspective of the home seller, the issue is whether 
there are significant gains to listing with some agents in preference to others. The first section of 
the paper develops an analytical model to assess agent performance. The second section presents 
empirical estimates of the model drawn from the MLS in Greensboro, NC. The final section 
summarizes relevant findings. 
 
II. REAL ESTATE AGENTS AND HOUSING PRICES 
When selecting a real estate agent to sell a home, a seller presumably chooses the agent that the 
seller believes will sell the home at the highest price in the shortest possible time. The question 
in which we are interested is whether the seller's choice of a real estate agent makes any 
difference to selling price or time on the market (TOM). The answer to the question hinges on 
the character of the housing market. If information is widely disseminated among agents, then no 
agent is likely to possess special advantage. A parallel might be drawn with the securities 
market: Does it make any difference which stock broker sells a stock? Clearly, in the securities 
market, information is so rapidly and widely available that no broker or firm normally is able to 
command a price premium. However, in the residential brokerage industry, the situation is less 
certain because market information is not so quickly or widely spread. At least, most brokers try 
to represent themselves as having special abilities and knowledge that enable them to sell a home 
more quickly and at a higher price than their rivals. 
 
Assume for the moment that all houses sold within an MLS are the same. The market price (P) of 
the average home is given by 
 
 
where TOM is time on the market and Z is a vector of firm and agent characteristics. It is 
expected that a1 > 0, because increasing TOM raises the probability of finding a buyer willing to 
pay a higher price. The natural log of TOM is used to allow the gains in price associated with 
longer TOM to rise at a decreasing rate.
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 Miller (1978) shows that selling price and TOM are positively related. 
 
Likewise, TOM is given by 
 
 
 
It is expected that b1 > 0 and B < 0. 
 
The reduced form equation of this simultaneous system is found by substituting Eq. (2) into Eq. 
(1), yielding 
 
 
 
Equation (3) can be simplified to 
 
 
The null hypothesis of the study is Ho: C = 0, that is, there are no significant differences among 
firms or agents in the prices they obtain for the houses they sell.
3
 
 
 
Recognizing that all houses are not the same, but rather can be represented as varying bundles of 
different characteristics, changes the housing price equation. Equation (4) becomes 
 
 
 
where X is a vector of housing and neighborhood characteristics, including the time of sale. 
 
We define a home's "expected" market value to be the value predicted by an hedonic 
equation, which is estimated by the regression of selling price (P) on the vector X: 
 
 
 
Substituting Eq. (5) into Eq. (4) gives 
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 In terms of the structural equations, a finding that C = 0 is consistent with either A = B = 0 or A = —a1B. In the 
first instance, agents and firms have no special influence on price (A = 0) and TOM (B = 0). In the second case, the 
higher price resulting from a shift in Eq. (1) is offset by the lower TOM caused by a shift in Eq. (2). In this second 
case, the implication is that while some agents or firms produce a lower TOM, there is no influence on price. 
Because our model is not able to identify the structural equations, we can not distinguish the two alternatives. Thus, 
our results test only price effects. Nevertheless, price effects are important. A survey undertaken by the Federal 
Trade Commission (1983) revealed that 85.9% of home sellers felt that "obtaining the highest sales price
-
 was an 
important factor in picking a brokerage firm. 
4
 
 
If all prices in the foregoing equations are expressed in natural logarithms, the dependent 
variable (P
E
) in Eq. (6) may be interpreted as a percentage excess return above the predicted 
market price. The basic question of the study, therefore, may be formulated as: Are there excess 
returns attributable to particular brokerage firms or agents?
5
 
 
III. SAMPLE DATA 
The question of excess returns in the residential real estate market is tested with data from the 
Greensboro Regional REALTORS Association (Greensboro, NC) for the period starting 
September 1991 and ending in 4 September 1993. A total of 4183 housing transactions formed 
the initial data set; however, missing data and incorrect codings reduced the size of the sample. 
The final data set consists of 2630 dates, prices, property descriptions, and characteristics of 
houses sold through the MLS. The homes in the sample represent sales by 111 different 
brokerage firms involving more than 600 individual real estate agents. 
 
The operational model is defined as 
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 The two-stage approach adopted here is derived from the traditional econometric methodology for residual analysis 
(see Neter and Wasserman (1974), pp. 109-111). This approach also is in the tradition of a large body of financial 
market research that has focused on explaining patterns of excess market returns (see Ruback (1982), Mikkelson and 
Ruback (1985), and Asquith and Mullins (1986)). The methodology also allows us to minimize potential problems 
of multicollinearity that may arise because of market segmentation in the brokerage industry. Such segmentation 
may result in particular firms or agents being correlated with specific housing characteristics. By focusing on excess 
market returns, we are able to minimize the potential contaminating effects of such collinearity. 
5
 We are concerned with percentage excess returns rather than the magnitude of absolute excess returns. This 
formulation of the dependent variable eliminates potential scale effects that could arise in comparing return patterns 
between low- and high-valued homes. 
The excess return,  reflects the difference between the log of the actual selling price and the 
log of the predicted price from the hedonic regression equation capturing housing and 
neighborhood characteristics. The hedonic model coefficients used to estimate the predicted 
prices are shown in the Appendix. 
 
Including the listing price (P
L
) and change in listing price (ΔP
L
) variables in Eq. (8) provides a 
test of the marketing strategy employed by the listing agent and the home seller. An important 
determinant of excess return is the list price (P
L
) of a home. Higher priced homes can be ex-
pected to be associated with greater atypicality.
6
 The variation in offer prices is likely to be 
greater for more expensive homes. This is because the actual value of higher priced homes is 
more difficult to precisely assess due to greater dissimilarities with other homes on the market. 
Given a seller's time frame for selling a house, a greater price variation works to the advantage of 
the seller because it increases the probability of obtaining an offer at or above the seller's 
threshold price.
7
 Accordingly, we anticipate a positive relation between the listing price and the 
excess return. Additional support of including the list price in Eq. (8) is found in Horowitz 
(1992). 
 
Repricing signals also may affect the seller's excess return. When changing the list price of a 
home, does the seller send a new signal to market participants about the seller's threshold price, 
or alternatively, does the relisting constitute a marketing artifice? If a seller's threshold price is 
reduced, the seller's excess return should decline. Conversely, if the relisting does not change the 
seller's threshold acceptance level, the excess return should not change. The relisting effect (ΔP
L
) 
is measured as the difference between the log of the original list price and the log of the final list 
price, or the percentage change in the list price. 
 
The independent variables also capture the effects of firm and agent characteristics and expertise. 
The shift parameters for the selling and listing offices capture differences in organizational 
efficiencies such as reputation, franchising, and firm-specific advertising or selling techniques 
that may enable the selling or listing firm to extract a higher excess return for the seller. In an 
efficient market, where information is conveyed rapidly and is widely disseminated among 
market participants, no firm is able to extract an excess return for the seller through a listing or 
selling agent's special knowledge or abilities. Although a multiple listing service does help make 
the residential real estate market more efficient, the market for residential real estate is still not 
expected to be as informationally efficient as the markets for selling equity and debt securities. 
The existence of statistically significant shift parameters for listing (STL) and selling (STS) 
firms supports the argument that some firms have special abilities and knowledge that result in 
excess returns for their clients. 
 
One might suspect the possibility of a selectivity bias in the analysis because buyers and sellers 
are not randomly assigned to real estate firms, but actively pick their brokers. If brokers are 
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 Haurin (1988) has shown that houses with higher listing prices tend to be more atypical. 
7
 On this point, see Haurin (1988). A seller's threshold price (the price the seller is willing to accept) is assumed to 
be less than or equal to the list price. Although the list price does not legally constitute an offer price, a seller who 
refuses to sell at the list price may face the substantial penalty of having to pay a commission to the broker even 
though the property is not sold (Dasso and Ring (1989), p. 122). Because of this penalty, most sellers are reluctant to 
decline an offer at the list price. 
chosen by buyers and sellers, then price differentials could potentially result from the differences 
among buyers and sellers, not from differences in broker productivity. Were this to be the case, 
one would expect to find that house prices vary among different groups of home buyers. This 
question has been examined recently by Turnbull and Sirmans (1993). Using MLS data from 
Baton Rouge, LA, they report no significant differences in housing prices across various groups 
of buyers. The results of Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) indicate that whatever price differentials 
prevail in the market, they are not associated with identifiable characteristics of home buyers and 
sellers. 
 
Another issue related to market efficiency is the question of whether having the identical listing 
and selling firm involved in a transaction creates an excess return for the seller.
8
 In a transaction 
where the selling and listing firms are identical, there is the prospect that the buyer is at a 
disadvantage. Because the seller's listing firm negotiates both ends of the deal, the seller may 
obtain some enhanced bargaining power relative to the buyer. An independent variable (I) 
captures if the listing and selling firm are the same for a home sale transaction (I 1 if same, 0 
otherwise).
9
 
 
Although we address the possibility that specialized abilities and knowledge may exist at the 
firm level through the use of the shift variables (ST
L
 and ST
S
), individual agents also may 
possess special advantages. Such advantages could occur because of numerous factors including 
work experience, training, and other resources.
10
 Although these factors contribute to agent 
productivity, the many and varied nature of these variables makes measurement difficult. We 
focus on the outcome of these measures which is the number of sales consummated for the 
listing (N
L
) and selling agents (N
s
).
11
 Conventional wisdom suggests that listing agents who have 
sold many homes help the seller extract a higher return. However, a converse argument could be 
made: Successful listing agents may achieve high sales by prompting their clients to accept lower 
offer prices in their efforts to close (see Salant (1991)). From the selling agent's perspective, a 
successful selling agent may be one who persuades the buyer to offer a higher "bid" price. 
Therefore, an experienced selling agent offering guidance to the buyer might result in a larger 
excess return to the seller. 
 
Table I shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in the regression model. Applying the 
antilogarithm to the maximum number of sales, the listing agent and selling agent maximum 
values are 39 and 72, respectively. The minimum is one home sale for listing and selling agents. 
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 For discussion and evidence of the perceptions of consumers and agents involved in this kind of transaction, see 
Ball and Nourse (1988). An excellent discussion of the legal issues in this type of relationship can be found in Marsh 
and Zumpano (1988). In our sample of MLS sales in Greensboro, NC, the listing and selling agents were the same in 
33% of the transactions. 
9
  One might suspect that there also is a correlation between 1 and TOM. In our sample, we find that I and TOM 
have a statistically significant negative correlation. As pointed out in Footnote 3, when there is a shift in one of the 
structural equations (Eq. (1) or (2)), one is likely to observe both price and TOM effects. Because we have focused 
on price effects, we do not explore this issue. For other studies that have examined the relationship between TOM 
and I, see Frew (1987) and Sirmans et a!. (1991). 
10
 For analysis of the determinants of REALTOR productivity and earnings, see Crellin et al. (1988) and Glower and 
Hendershott (1988). 
11
 Given the number of agents in the study, the use of dummy variables for individual agents is not feasible. The 
number of dummy variables is too large, and collinearity with the structural variables for the firm exists. 
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Table II reports the ordinary least-squares (OLS) and fixed-effects regression results. The fixed-
effects model includes the dummy variables for individual listing and selling offices (ST
L
 and 
ST
s
). Both regression equations are significant at the 0.01 level. For the fixed effects model, we 
conducted a joint test of restricted versus unrestricted models for the selling and listing office 
dummy variables. The Chow tests yield F values of 0.70 and 0.78 for the selling and listing 
structural variables, respectively, which are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This 
finding is consistent with the conclusion that listing and selling offices do not possess special 
abilities and knowledge that enable them to sell similar homes at higher prices than their rivals. 
From another point of view, this finding is consistent with an efficient residential real estate 
market, where individual firms do not possess special advantages because information is shared 
among agents and firms through the MLS. 
 
As anticipated, the list price (P
L
) is highly significant in explaining the excess returns. 
Interpreting this coefficient, a 1% rise in the list price results in a 0.12% increase in the excess 
return. Therefore, more expensive homes appear to offer higher excess returns for the seller. This 
result is consistent with the argument that more expensive homes are more atypical, which 
increases the variation of offer prices and enables the seller to have a higher acceptance threshold 
given a target time on the market. 
 
 
 
The coefficients for the number of sales for both listing and selling agents (N
L
 and N
s
) are not 
statistically significant for the fixed-effects regression, and the number of sales for the listing 
agent has a marginally significant negative coefficient under OLS. Consequently, individual 
agent abilities and knowledge do not appear to produce excess returns for the seller. These 
findings also are consistent with an efficient market for residential real estate. 
 
Although the findings in Table H do not support the importance of firm and agent qualities in 
generating positive excess return for the seller, having the same listing and selling firm does 
seem to influence the seller's excess return. Looking at the fixed-effects regression, the 
coefficient on the dummy variable (I), which shows the effect on returns when the selling and 
listing office are the same, is 0.0147. The percentage increase in excess returns associated with 
having the same the selling and listing office is 100*(e
0.0147
-1), or 1.5%. This finding suggests 
that the selling agent may try harder to extract a higher price from the buyer when both the 
selling and listing agents are employed in the same brokerage firm.
12
 
 
The list price change variable (ΔP
L
) shows a strong presence in the regressions, indicating that a 
change in the list price sends a pricing signal to the marketplace and is more than a marketing 
gimmick. Table II reports a positive coefficient of 0.65 under the fixed-effects model, which is 
statistically significant at 0.01. Therefore, a 1% change in the original list price results in an 
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 Frew (1987) and Frew et al. (1993) offer theory and evidence that larger brokerage firms are more likely to sell 
their own listings. 
average 0.65% change in the seller's excess return. Although this relation is inelastic, closing 
prices clearly are influenced by listing repricing. Reducing the listed price of a home appears to 
send a strong signal that the reservation price of the seller has been lowered. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This paper explores the effect of real estate brokerage firm and agent characteristics on the prices 
received by home sellers in a multiple listing service. The study finds no evidence that some 
brokers are able to obtain higher prices for the homes they sell than are others. This finding is 
consistent with the idea of efficient information flow in the MLS market, where firms and 
individuals do not possess special advantages since information within the MLS is shared among 
agents and firms. Our results are consistent with the study by Turnbull and Sirmans which 
reported that prices do not vary among home buyers. 
 
Our findings raise the issue of why there is not more direct price competition among firms within 
an MLS? If sellers were to understand that all firms in an MLS are the same, that is, no one is 
able to command a higher price for the seller than another, then sellers would seem to be drawn 
to the lowest price firms. The fact that price competition is not widely observed suggests that 
most sellers do not believe that all firms are the same. This apparent misinformation in the 
perceptions of home sellers is a subject that warrants substantial additional research. 
 
The study finds strong evidence that pricing signals in terms of list price and changes in the 
listed price are very important in the residential market. Repricing a listed house appears to send 
a strong signal to market participants about the seller's minimum reservation price. Lowering the 
listed price sends the signal that the home seller's reservation price has been reduced. 
 
Last, our study reveals that home sellers obtain higher prices when the listing agent is also the 
selling agent. In transactions where the listing and selling firms are the same, seller excess 
returns appear to be 1.5 to 1.9% higher, suggesting that buyers are at a bargaining disadvantage. 
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